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WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 4

MARYLAND
Serra v. Md. Dep't of the Env't, 758 A.2d 1057 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2000) (holding the Maryland Department of the Environment
("MDE") could prohibit further construction on an existing pier,
which would require no dredging or filling of wetlands, because
conditions imposed on the pier's original license permitted the MDE
to make a separate determination of the new structure's impact on
state wetlands).
John Serra ("Serra") owned property bounded by a creek in
Pasadena, Maryland. In 1995, a previous owner of the property
obtained a license to construct a pier that would extend into the creek.
After construction in 1998, Serra applied for a license to attach a
covered structure to the existing pier on his property. This proposed
structure would extend over the water and serve to protect his boat
while moored.
The Maryland Department of the Environment ("MDE") denied
Serra's request. MDE considered the proposed structure to be a
"boathouse," which was regulated under state wetlands protection
statutes because of its potential ecological impacts. Serra appealed the
denial to the Maryland Circuit Court.
The circuit court affirmed MDE's decision. The circuit court
based its ruling on a statute different than the one MDE used. Under
such statute, the circuit court determined that MDE had the authority
to deny licenses for the construction of "non-water dependent"
structures on piers located on wetlands. According to the circuit
court, Serra's proposed structure met this description and could,
therefore, be prohibited by MDE. Serra appealed the circuit court's
ruling.
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court,
but found its reliance on a different statute erroneous because Serra's
proposed structure was not "non-water dependent." Instead, the
appellate court found MDE had authority to prohibit the structure on
other grounds.
According to the appellate court, Maryland's Wetlands Act ("Act")
authorized MDE to regulate "dredging, dumping, filling, and like
activities" that involved state wetlands. In addition, regulations
promulgated under the Act gave MDE authority to restrict boathouse
construction. The key question, according to the appellate court, was
whether MDE could still restrict the construction of a boathouse that
did not involve dredging or filling activities. The appellate court felt
the state legislature had anticipated this problem by giving MDE the
ability to impose conditions on licenses to construct piers. The
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conditions imposed on the original license for Serra's existing pier
reserved MDE's continuing right to determine if a modification was
"minor," requiring an adjustment to the existing license, or "major"
requiring a new application procedure with MDE. According to the
appellate court, Serra's proposed structure was a "major" modification
and, therefore, MDE's denial of the boathouse was within its
regulatory authority.
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MASSACHUSETFS
Fafard v. Conservation Comm'n of Barnstable, 733 N.E.2d 66 (Mass.
2000) (holding (1) a portion of town's wetlands protection bylaws,
which purported to protect the public's interests under the public
trust doctrine, were invalid; (2) state statutes regarding the regulation
of pier construction only established minimum statewide standards
and did not preempt local pier regulations; and (3) local conservation
commission had the authority to deny property owner's request to
build a pier).
The town of Barnstable ("Barnstable") enacted wetlands bylaws in
order to regulate work in and around wetlands more strictly than
Massachusetts's wetlands protection act, and to protect public trust
rights in trust lands. Pursuant to the town's wetlands bylaws, the
Conservation Commission of Barnstable ("Commission") had the
authority to issue and to deny permits for the building of private piers
and docks. In 1997, the Fafards, property owners, filed a notice of
intent with the Commission seeking permission to build a fixed pier
on the Eel River, a narrow coastal inlet. The pier would occupy more
than twenty percent of the width of the river in violation of Barnstable
pier regulations as adopted by the Commission, and would stand on
public trust lands.
After two public hearings, the Commission denied the Fafards'
application finding that the proposed pier would significantly impact
recreation and public trust rights. After the superior court affirmed
the Commission's ruling, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
granted the Fafards' application for direct appellate review. The
Fafards argued the bylaws and pier regulations of Barnstable were
invalid because only the state may act to further public trust rights.
The Fafards also asserted state statutes concerning the licensing of
structures and piers on coastal lands preempted the Barnstable pier
regulations on which the Commission based its decision.
The court agreed with the Fafards that, under the public trust
doctrine, only the state, or an entity to which the state has expressly
delegated authority, may act to further public trust rights. Under the

